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The Role of Competition Policy
in Canada's Industrial Policy
Calvin S. Goldman, Q.C.*
Joel T. Kissack**
INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the objectives of Canada's industrial policy and
the role of competition law and policy (or simply, "competition pol-
icy") in achieving those objectives. It will demonstrate that Canada's
competition policy, principally as a result of substantial reforms in
1986, largely reflects Canada's industrial policy objectives, although
further reforms are desirable in some areas.
Part One of this paper defines "industrial policy" for the purposes
of this paper and outlines the objectives of Canada's industrial policy.
Part Two discusses the importance of competition policy and certain
features of Canada's economy that shape competition policy. Part
Three examines specific provisions of Canada's Competition Act' (the
"Act") and the enforcement policies of the Director of Investigation
and Research (the "Director") and the extent to which they reflect the
objectives of Canada's industrial policy. Part Four of this paper dis-
cusses proposals for reform in competition policy and related areas.
PART ONE: CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND ITS OBJECTIVES
(i) Defining Industrial Policy
In a recent draft paper (the "Anderson/Khosla Draft Paper"),
Robert Anderson and Dev Khosla of the Bureau of Competition Policy
(the "Bureau") defined industrial policy as the "full range of measures
through which governments seek to enhance the performance of indi-
vidual industries as well as the economy as a whole". 2 They also
pointed out that industrial policy could be defined to include only those
economic policies that provide special advantages or assistance to par-
ticular industries,3 such as subsidies to specific industries. The first defi-
* Partner, Davies, Ward & Beck, Toronto, Canada. From May 1986 until October 1989,
Mr. Goldman was the Director of Investigation and Research, Bureau of Competition Policy,
Ottawa, Canada.
** Partner, Davies, Ward & Beck, Toronto, Canada.
1 Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985), amended 1985, 1990 (Can.).
2 Robert D. Anderson and S. Dev. Khosla, COMPETITION POLICY As A DIMENSION OF IN-
DUSTRIAL POLICY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (June 1993) (draft at 4).
3Id.
1
Goldman and Kissack: The Role of Competition Policy in Canada's Industrial Policy
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1993
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
nition would include competition policy as an element of industrial pol-
icy, while the second would not. The first definition of industrial policy
will be used in this paper.
(ii) The Objectives of Canada's Industrial Policy
When the current federal Government came to power in 1984,
then Finance Minister Michael Wilson said the federal Government's
objective was to:
put in place a policy framework that will release the creative energies
of Canadians to build a better future for themselves . . .[and] adopt
policies that foster higher investment, greater innovation, increased in-
ternational competitiveness and a positive climate for the birth and
growth of new enterprise.4
The need to enhance the competitiveness of Canadian industries is
particularly acute today, given the globalization of many markets and
the presence of trading blocs such as the European Community. To
meet the challenges presented by these developments, industries in Ca-
nada and the United States are rationalizing to attain economies of
scale and efficiencies that will enable them to produce world class prod-
ucts at competitive prices. The recessionary environment has made
these challenges even more difficult to meet.
The trend to globalization is especially significant for Canada be-
cause of its dependence on trade. A 1990 study co-sponsored by the
Canadian federal Government (hereinafter, the "Government") and
conducted by Professor Michael Porter of Harvard Business School and
Monitor Company' (hereinafter the "Porter Study") described the ex-
port sector as a "vital component of Canada's economy" and noted
that Canada was second only to Germany in the importance of trade to
its economy. In a 1991 consultation paper entitled Prosperity Through
Competitiveness,8 the Government noted that since the Second World
War, Canada's reliance on trade has doubled to reach over thirty per-
cent of gross domestic product ("GDP"), more than twice the level for
Canada's two largest trading partners: Japan, where trade accounts for
fourteen percent of GDP, and the United States, where trade accounts
" CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, A NEW DIRECTION FOR CANADA - AN AGENDA
FOR ECONOMIC RENEWAL, at 2-3, Nov. 8, 1984.
1 Michael E. Porter & Monitor Company, Canada at the Crossroads: The Reality of a New
Competitive Environment (Oct. 1991) [hereinafter the "Porter Study"] (Summary of a Study
prepared for the Business Council on National Issues and the Government of Canada).
6 Id. at 10.
7 Id.
8 CANADA, PROSPERITY THROUGH COMPETITIVENESS (Consultation Paper: Issues for Discus-
sion) (1991).
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for ten percent of GDP.' Canada also relies extensively on a single
market, the United States, where seventy-five percent of its exported
goods and services are destined.10
In summary, since 1984, increased international competitiveness
has been a key industrial policy objective. At the same time, the impor-
tance of achieving this objective has grown.
It appears that further progress is needed. The Porter Study iden-
tified weaknesses in the Canadian economy such as low productivity
growth" and low private sector investment in research and develop-
ment.12 In 1991, the Government noted in Prosperity Through Com-
petitiveness that the growth in Canadian real income (adjusted for in-
flation) had been steadily slowing since the mid-1970s because of a
slowing trend in Canada's productivity growth.' 3 The C.D. Howe Insti-
tute, a well-respected Canadian research and educational institution,
noted in its 1991 Policy Review and Outlook that close to one-fifth of
the adult population is functionally illiterate - that is, reading at or
below the grade nine level.1 4 A recent Canadian Tax Foundation study
noted that Canadian tax increases between 1980 and 1991 "outstripped
nearly every major developed country". 5 Studies by other independent
groups confirm that action is needed: in 1992, the World Competitive-
ness Report, published by the World Economic Forum and the Interna-
tional Institute for Management Development, ranked Canada's com-
petitiveness eleventh among industrialized nations.'6 The previous year,
9 Id. at 32.
10 Id.
11 The Porter Study stated that between 1979 and 1989, manufacturing labour and produc-
tivity growth in Canada was the lowest among the G7 countries, averaging only 1.8 % per annum.
Porter Study, supra note 5, at 7.
" The Porter Study noted that private sector investment in research and development as a
percentage of GDP is the second lowest among the G7 countries. Porter Study, supra note 5, at 8.
13 PROSPERITY, supra note 8, at 2.
14 Bryne B. Purchase, The Innovative Society - Competitiveness in the 1990s (Policy Re-
view and Outlook, 1991), TORONTO: C.D. HOWE INSTITuTE, at 80 (1991).
15 Between 1980 and 1991, taxes in Canada increased nearly twenty-five percent, second
only to Italy among the G7 countries. See Canadian Press, Canada's Tax Hikes Outdo Most
Countries: Study, THE FIN. POST, March 26, 1993. It has also been noted that the average tax
burden in Canada is twenty-five percent higher as a percentage of GDP (about 7.5%) than in the
U.S. and that "[t]his makes Canada fundamentally uncompetitive". See Samuel Slutsky, A Tax
Reminder for Kim Campbell, THE FIN. POST, June 23, 1993, at 12.
16 The 1992 World Competitiveness Report indicated that Canada ranked twentieth out of
twenty-two industrialized countries on the need to restructure for long-term competitiveness. More
recent statistics concerning Canada's competitiveness are mixed. A 1993 study by the Bank of
Canada stated that over the period of 1980 to 1992, there was little net change in Canada's cost
competitiveness on an economy-wide basis. However, the same study noted that the Canadian
manufacturing sector had experienced a "substantial deterioration in competitiveness in recent
years", reflecting the fact that productivity growth in the Canadian manufacturing sector has
lagged behind its U.S. counterpart. See Productivity and Competitiveness of Canadian Firms
Since 1980, BANK OF CANADA REVIEW, Spring 1993. Further, the 1993 World Competitiveness
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Canada was fifth.
While further progress is needed, since 1984 the Government has
taken many steps to achieve its industrial policy objectives. A number
of sectors of the economy have been significantly deregulated, such as
transportation, financial services and natural gas. There are calls for
further deregulation. 17 Some Crown corporations have been privatized.
The Foreign Investment Review Act was replaced with the Investment
Canada Act to encourage investment in Canada by non-Canadians.
The Free Trade Agreement has been implemented and the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") has been signed and, at
least in Canada, ratified. The Government has attempted to eliminate
barriers to trade among the provinces, although they are still signifi-
cant. 8 Most importantly, for the purposes of this paper, Canada's com-
petition law was significantly revised in 1986 by amendments to the
Combines Investigation Act, which was renamed the Competition Act.
PART Two: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPETITION POLICY AND
CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF CANADA'S ECONOMY THAT SHAPE
COMPETITION POLICY
Canadian competition policy is based on the premise that free
market forces, operating under competitive conditions, are the best
means of allocating resources in the economy and maximizing total ec-
onomic welfare. 19 Competition policy, which applies to all industries on
a generic basis, is a key element of Canada's industrial policy.2 0 The
Report ranked Canada's competitiveness at eleventh among industrialized nations, unchanged
from 1992.
17 The National Transportation Act Review Commission (the "Commission") recently con-
sidered whether changes are needed to the National Transportation Act, 1987 (Canada), among
other reasons, to improve Canada's international competitiveness. The Commission suggested ad-
ditional deregulation and, in some cases, repealing the legislative provisions which regulate trans-
portation and relying instead on the provisions of the Competition Act to ensure markets func-
tioned effectively. See C.L. Witterick, Transporting Canada into the Global Economy: an
Increasing Role for the Competition Act, CANADIAN COMPETITION RECORD, 14-2 (forthcoming
July 1993).
18 The Government has estimated that these barriers add $6.5 billion in costs annually. Inter-
provincial barriers are discussed in "Proposals for Reform", infra Part Four. See also These Bar-
riers Must Come Down, THE FIN. POST, Nov. 20, 1992 at 8.
10 See Howard I. Wetston, Canadian Competition Law: Current Issues in Conspiracy Law
and Enforcement, at 1 (Notes for an Address at the Meredith Memorial Lectures, McGill Univer-
sity, Montreal, Nov. 30, 1990).
20 See Howard I. Wetston, The Evolving Role of Competition Policy in the 1990s, at 2
(Notes for an Address to the Canadian Club, Montreal, Feb. 12, 1990). See also Canada, PROS-
PERITY THROUGH COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 8, at 26 wherein the Government affirmed its
belief that:
[c]ompetition policy is a key element of the policy framework for a dynamic and competitive
market economy. By promoting a healthy rivalry among firms, competition enhances choices
for consumers and strengthens pressures that lead to continuing innovation in the provision
[Vol. 19:105 1993
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Porter Study stressed the importance of a strong competition law in
creating an environment that fosters international competitiveness."
The importance of competition policy is highlighted by the rela-
tively small size of Canada's economy, which significantly reduces the
scope for using alternatives such as subsidies to increase the competi-
tiveness of Canadian industries. The C.D. Howe Institute recently
noted22 that the cost of such subsidies is likely to be so substantial that
countries like Canada will simply be out-bid by countries with larger
economies. Thus, increasing the international competitiveness of Cana-
dian business must be achieved by relying on other means, including an
effective and realistic competition policy. Making competition policy ef-
fective and realistic includes taking account of certain characteristics of
Canada's economy.
The relatively small size of the Canadian economy is such that, in
some industries, relatively high levels of concentration are necessary
before minimum efficient scale can be achieved. Domestic firms often
need to achieve these scales to compete more effectively in international
markets. As a result, where mergers or specialization agreements23 are
required to achieve efficiencies and synergies, the objectives of Ca-
nada's industrial policy would suggest that concentration is not neces-
sarily bad and therefore a flexible approach to mergers and specializa-
tion agreements is appropriate. It would also suggest that as global
markets develop, what levels of concentration are acceptable in Canada
should be re-examined.24
However, concentration in an industry increases the risk of anti-
competitive behavior, such as price fixing and bid-rigging. These prac-
tices are widely condemned as having no redeeming social benefits.
Such activities can also affect the international competitiveness of Ca-
nadian firms, since collusion which raises prices or reduces the availa-
of goods and services.
However, Messrs. Anderson and Khosla note in their draft paper, supra note 2, at 10 that there is
considerable diversity of opinion respecting the importance of competition policy and that
"[a]dvocates of more traditional forms of industrial policy have suggested that competition policy
may deter necessary business restructuring and joint entrepreneurial efforts, and even questioned
the need for competition policy in the presence of increasing global competition."
2 Porter Study, supra note 5, at 55, 59-60. In PROSPERITY THROUGH COMPETITIVENESS,
supra note 8, at 6, the federal Government noted that developing a more competitive and demand-
ing Canadian marketplace is a key element of ensuring Canada's prosperity.
22 Purchase, supra note 14, at 55.
3 In specialization agreements, each of the parties agrees to discontinue production of a
particular good or service. The purpose of such agreements is to facilitate rationalization of pro-
duction within industries. Specialization agreements are discussed in "How Well Canadian Com-
petition Policy Reflects Canada's Industrial Policy Objectives", infra Part Three.
24 The Government noted in PROSPERITY THROUGH COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 8, at 26
that Canada "will need to examine constantly what level of concentration is appropriate in partic-
ular in Canadian markets to enable industries to compete successfully internationally and to main-
tain a strong rivalry in domestic markets".
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bility of intermediate goods or other inputs can affect negatively the
attractiveness of Canadian products compared to those offered by for-
eign suppliers. 5 Similarly, abuses of market power by dominant firms
that prevent or lessen competition can increase costs for Canadian busi-
nesses above those that would exist in the presence of competition.
Thus, a flexible approach to mergers and specialization agreements
should be balanced by a strict approach to conspiracies in restraint of
trade and abuses of market power.
The past influence of political considerations on Canada's indus-
trial policy is another characteristic of Canada's economy that affects
competition policy. The Porter Study noted that:
Governments in Canada have often had a detrimental effect on the
competitiveness of Canadian industries. Traditionally, Canadian gov-
ernments have exhibited a paternalistic outlook in their management
of the economy, often seeking to insulate the Canadian economy from
international competition through such mechanisms as high tariffs,
subsidies, government ownership and other interventionist policies.
Government has been a protector, an agent of economic development,
and a generous provider of goods and benefits. Only infrequently has
government in Canada aggressively pressed firms to innovate, upgrade
competitive advantage and meet high standards.26
Canada's industrial policy seeks to increase the role of market
forces. However, because of political expediency or the influence of
more powerful interests, governments do not always act in a manner
consistent with this stated policy objective.17 As a result, the enforce-
ment of competition policy in Canada needs to be independent of all
levels of government and political considerations.
In summary, the objectives of Canada's industrial policy focus on
developing international competitiveness. While recent studies suggest
that more work needs to be done, the Government has taken several
steps in furtherance of its industrial policy objectives. Competition pol-
icy is one of the areas where there has been significant progress. As we
shall see in the next section of this paper, in 1986 the Government
introduced a number of reforms with the result that Canada's competi-
tion policy now largely reflects the objectives of its industrial policy.
25 Wetston, supra note 19, at 2.
28 Porter Study, supra note 5, at 43-44.
27 In addition to inconsistency at the federal level, many sectors of the economy are subject
to regulation by the provincial governments. While it may be desirable, there is no requirement
that the ten provincial governments always act in a manner consistent with the Government's
stated policy objectives.
[Vol. 19:105 1993
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PART THREE: How WELL CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY
REFLECTS CANADA'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY OBJECTIVES
This section will examine several elements of Canadian competi-
tion policy 28 and demonstrate that Canada's competition policy largely
reflects its industrial policy objectives. In some cases, this conclusion
can be drawn from the provisions of the Act itself. In other areas, the
Director's enforcement policies make the legislative provisions more re-
sponsive to Canada's industrial policy objectives.
(i) The Act
The Act has a purpose clause. Section 1.1 states that the purpose
of the Act is to maintain and encourage competition in Canada, in or-
der to achieve four objectives: (i) promoting the efficiency and adapta-
bility of the Canadian economy; (ii) expanding opportunities for Cana-
dian participation in world markets (while at the same time
recognizing the role of foreign competition in Canada); (iii) ensuring
that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity
to participate in the Canadian economy; and (iv) providing consumers
with competitive prices and product choices.
It has been noted that these four objectives may not be consis-
tent.29 Arguably, ensuring that small or medium-sized enterprises have
an "equitable opportunity" to participate in the Canadian economy is
inconsistent with the objectives of promoting efficiency and expanding
opportunities for Canadian participation in world markets, which are
often based on rationalization. Reflecting these apparent inconsisten-
cies, the Act contains both provisions which are consistent with the
objectives of Canada's industrial policy as well as provisions which
seem more concerned with protecting small businesses, even at the cost
of efficiency. Certain provisions of the Act strongly reflect the objec-
tives of Canada's industrial policy. Some of the most important are the
provisions respecting mergers. As part of the extensive revisions to the
Act in 1986, the former criminal law provisions respecting mergers
were replaced with an administrative law review which precludes
25 In CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS CANADA, CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY: ITS
INTERFACE WITH OTHER ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES (A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION)
(Sept. 1989) the Bureau notes at 4 that competition policy in Canada encompasses: (i) the admin-
istration and enforcement of the Act; (ii) intervention before federal and provincial regulatory
agencies making decisions that affect competition in particular markets; (iii) the provision of input
to the design and implementation of other government policies that affect the competitive market
system; and (iv) representing Canada's interest in international competition policy fora. In this
paper, we are primarily concerned with the administration and enforcement of the Act. It should
be noted, however, that a former Director has suggested that in the 1990s the Bureau will pursue
competition in the regulated sectors of the Canadian economy. See Wetston, supra note 20, at 7-
8.
, " See Anderson & Khosla, supra note 2, at 35-36.
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reaching conclusions. solely on the basis of concentration or market
share,30 and which draws attention to the relevance of a host of realistic
qualitative factors.3 1 Further, the Act specifically provides that the
Competition Tribunal (the "Tribunal"), a quasi-judicial tribunal that
has jurisdiction over mergers and certain other matters, may not block
a merger if it finds that the merger has brought about or is likely to
bring about gains in efficiency that will be greater than and will offset
any anti-competitive effects of the merger, so long as the gains in effi-
ciency would not likely be attained if the merger were blocked. For this
purpose, the Director takes the view that "anti-competitive effects" re-
fers to the part of the total loss incurred by buyers and sellers in Ca-
nada that is not merely a transfer from one party to another, but repre-
sents a loss to the economy as a whole, attributable to the diversion of
resources to lower value uses. 2 This loss is sometimes referred to as the
deadweight loss to the Canadian economy. In the Director's view, if the
Canadian economy as a whole would benefit from the merger, the Act
explicitly resolves the conflict between competition and efficiency in
favor of efficiency.33
The efficiency exception is particularly noteworthy, for two rea-
sons. First, it distinguishes Canadian competition policy from U.S.
competition policy. The joint Merger Guidelines recently issued by the
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission appear
to be more receptive to efficiencies than previous U.S. guidelines, but
they do not change the basic consumer surplus approach that efficien-
cies will not permit a merger which otherwise negatively impacts con-
30 The Competition Tribunal, a quasi-judicial tribunal, is given the power by the Act to pre-
vent and dissolve mergers where the merger would "prevent or lessen, or be likely to prevent or
lessen, competition substantially". Subsection 92(2) of the Act provides that the Tribunal "shall
not find that a merger or proposed merger prevents or lessens, or is likely to prevent or lessen,
competition substantially solely on the basis of evidence of concentration or market share", The
Act, supra note 1.
31 For example, the role of foreign competition, the nature and extent of change and innova-
tion in the relevant market and whether the business or a part of the business of a party to the
merger is likely to fail. See section 93 of the Act. In the Anderson & Khosla Draft Paper, supra
note 2, at 35, the authors express the view that "[t]hese factors respond directly to developments
such as the growth of foreign competition and the need to facilitate the efficient restructuring of
Canadian businesses". See also CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS OF CANADA, supra note 28,
at 25.
3' CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS OF CANADA, MERGER ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES
(1991) at 45 [hereafter, the "MEGs"]. For a discussion of the approach to efficiencies taken in
the Act, see P.S. Crampton, The Efficiency Exception for Mergers: An Assessment of Early Sig-
nals from the Competition Tribunal, 121-3 CAN. Bus. L.J., 371 (1993). However, the Tribunal's
decision in Director of Investigation and Research v. Hillsdown Holdings (Canada) Ltd. (infra
note 68) has raised some concerns about the manner in which the Tribunal may apply the effi-
ciency provisions of the Act. This issue is further discussed in "Proposals for Reform", infra Part
Four.
" See the MEGs, supra note 32, at 45.
[Vol. 19:105 1993
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sumer prices.34 Second, the efficiency exception reflects one of the fea-
tures of the Canadian economy mentioned in Part Two of this paper;
namely, the relatively small size of Canada's economy. Achieving the
objectives of Canada's industrial policy in the context of Canada's rela-
tively small economy suggests that Canadian businesses should be per-
mitted to rationalize (and therefore reduce competition) if doing so
permits them to operate in a more efficient manner.35
The provisions respecting specialization agreements were intro-
duced as part of the 1986 reforms and also reflect Canada's industrial
policy objectives.36 The Act provides that the conspiracy provisions and
the abuse of dominance provision (as it applies to exclusive dealing) do
not apply to a registered specialization agreement.3 " To register, a per-
son must apply to the Tribunal, which is entitled to balance efficiencies
arising from the agreement against the effects of any prevention or les-
sening of competition. 8
New provisions respecting joint ventures were also introduced in
1986. The Act provides that the Tribunal will not block or dissolve a
joint venture to undertake a specific project or program of research and
development if, among other things, the joint venture does not and is
not likely to prevent or lessen competition except to the extent reasona-
bly required to undertake and complete the project or program. Joint
ventures which satisfy the criteria are exempt from the merger provi-
sions of the Act, which means that all the considerations (the role of
foreign competition and barriers to entry, for example) that would nor-
mally be applied in considering a merger are not considered in the con-
text of the joint venture.3 9 Further, unlike the specialization agreement
' See Anderson & Khosla, supra note 2, at 45 n.139.
" In CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS CANADA, COMPETITION LAW AMENDMENTS: A
GUIDE (December 1985) at 16 the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs noted that:
The existing merger provision [i.e., the criminal law merger provision that was con-
tained in the Combines Investigation Act] is considered to be unsuitable for the Canadian
economy, which is small and open. Canadian firms often have to compete with larger foreign
rivals both at home and abroad. In these circumstances, they should not be prevented from
obtaining economies of scale which improve their competitive position. An effective merger
law for Canada must weigh the advantages of economic efficiency against the disadvantages
of a lessening of competition.
" Section 85 of the Act, supra note I defines a specialization agreement as follows:
'Specialization Agreement' means an agreement under which each party thereto agrees
to discontinue producing an article or service that he is engaged in producing at the time the
agreement is entered into on the condition that each other party to the agreement agrees to
discontinue producing an article or service that he is engaged in producing at the time the
agreement is entered into, and includes any such agreement under which the parties also
agree to buy exclusively from each other the articles or services that are the subject of the
agreement.
W7 See § 90 of the Act, supra note 1.
"s See § 86(1) of the Act, supra note 1.
11 For a further discussion of these provisions, see H.I. Wetston, The Treatment of Co-opera-
tive R&D Activities Under The Competition Act, Notes for an Address to the Committee on
9
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provisions, joint ventures do not need to be registered. The provisions
are merely raised as a defense to an application by the Director chal-
lenging the joint venture under the merger provisions of the Act. These
simpler rules respecting joint ventures facilitate their formation and
therefore encourage research and development.
As with the efficiency exemption in the merger provisions, the joint
venture provisions distinguish Canadian competition policy from its
American counterpart. Specifically, the National Cooperative Research
and Production Act of 1993 applies to research and development and
production joint ventures, while the Canadian provisions apply to re-
search and development joint ventures and joint ventures established to
carry out a "specific project".40 Further, while the merger provisions of
the Act will not apply to qualifying joint ventures, the U.S. legislation
in contrast provides that qualifying joint ventures will be judged under
a "rule of reason" standard under conspiracy laws and not considered
illegal per se.41
The Act, unlike its predecessor legislation, deals with mergers and
monopolies outside the criminal law context, where the standard of
proof and the remedies of fines and imprisonment are particularly ill-
suited to achieving industrial policy objectives."2 This non-criminal ap-
proach, which is also the approach adopted toward most non-price ver-
tical restraints, recognizes that firms are more likely to pursue efficient
practices if they do not have to face the prospect of imprisonment or
fines.
The flexible policy applied to mergers, specialization agreements
and joint ventures is balanced by a strict approach to conspiracies and
bid-rigging. The Act provides unlimited fines for bid-rigging and fines
of up to ten million dollars for conspiracy. The Director assigns the
highest priority to enforcing the bid-rigging, conspiracy and abuse of
dominance provisions of the Act43 and recent speeches by the Director
indicate that the Bureau intends to deter such conduct by pursuing
Science and Technology, Canadian Manufacturers Association (March 4, 1988).
40 Id. at 5. For discussion of the recent amendments to the U.S. legislation introducing provi-
sions respecting production joint ventures, see Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 1618 (BNA),
688:1 (June 10, 1993).
41 The Canadian provisions do not insulate parties to a joint venture from charges under the
conspiracy provisions. The Act provides that a person will not be made subject to proceedings on
the basis of the same facts under more than one of the conspiracy, abuse of dominance or merger
provisions. The Director is at liberty to select which of these three remedies he might choose to
pursue. See §§ 45.1, 79(7) and 98 of the Act, supra note 1.
42 See CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS CANADA, supra note 35, at 3, 16-17.
43 See, e.g., Howard I. Wetston, Q.C., Decisions and Developments: Competition Law and
Policy, Remarks delivered to the Canadian Institute, Toronto at 9 (June 8, 1992). Assigning a
high priority to enforcing these provisions is consistent with the industrial policy objectives identi-
fied in this paper. In R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society et al. (see infra note 45),
Gonthier, J. referred to the conspiracy provisions as "central to Canadian public policy in the
economic sector".
[Vol. 19:105 1993
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substantial fines and, in appropriate cases, the prosecution of individual
executives involved in conspiracies or bid-rigging. 4
While high fines and the priority given to enforcing these provi-
sions are consistent with industrial policy objectives, the conspiracy
provisions do not permit consideration of any efficiencies arising from
co-operation between competitors. The decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada in R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society et al. (herein-
after "PANS")4 5 confirmed that the conspiracy provisions contemplate
a "partial rule of reason" analysis that forecloses consideration of effi-
ciencies if the agreement is likely to prevent or lessen competition un-
duly. While this is probably the proper approach with respect to naked
price fixing cartels, some may suggest that Canada's conspiracy law
may be impeding the pursuit of efficiency-enhancing activities.
To insulate enforcement of competition policy from the political
influences mentioned in the Porter Study, the Act provides for the en-
forcement of competition law in many respects46 by the Director, who
exercises his mandate independently of political considerations and
influences.
In summary, the merger, specialization agreement, joint venture
and, to some extent, the conspiracy provisions of the Act, reflect the
objectives of Canada's industrial policy. This may not be true of certain
other provisions of the Act. In many cases, the Director's enforcement
policies help to make the legislative provisions more responsive to in-
dustrial policy objectives.
(ii) The Director's Enforcement Policies
The provisions of the Act which may not be consistent with Ca-
nada's industrial policy objectives underscore the importance of the Di-
rector's role in making and implementing competition policy. For ex-
ample, the Director's recently announced enforcement policy respecting
price discrimination 47 allows for functional and other types of discounts
previously considered illegal on a strict reading of the Act, if they are
" In the past three years, there has been a series of record fines imposed for conspiracy.
Most recently, on June 11, 1993, Chemagro Limited was fined two million dollars for domestic
and foreign-directed conspiracies. For a discussion of the Director's policies with respect to fines
and individual prosecution, see Paul S. Crampton and Joel T. Kissack, Recent Developments in
Conspiracy Law and Enforcement: New Risks and Opportunities, 38 MCGILL L.J. 567 (1993).
See also Calvin S. Goldman, The Competition Bureau's New Focus: Increased Risks for Individ-
uals Under the Competition Act, 13, CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY RECORD (1992).
4 R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society et al., 43 C.P.R. (Can. 3d) 1 (1992) (hereinaf-
ter PANS).
41 For example, only the Director may challenge a merger or bring an action under the abuse
of dominance provision of the Act. This is in contrast to the ability of private parties or state
attorneys-general in the U.S. to challenge mergers and abuses of market power.
47 CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS CANADA, PRICE DISCRIMINATION ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES (1992).
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made available to competing purchasers of like quality and quantity.
This allows vendors to respond more flexibly to conditions and changes
in the market for their goods.
The Director's recently announced enforcement policy respecting
predatory pricing48 similarly attempts to respond to the objectives of
Canada's industrial policy. The Act provides that it is a criminal of-
fense to engage in a policy of selling products at unreasonably low
prices with the intent of eliminating a competitor (regardless of
whether competition is in fact adversely affected as a result). The Di-
rector's policy contemplates enforcement only where, among other
things, the alleged predator has market power (i.e., is likely to be able
to recoup profits lost during the period of alleged predation). The Di-
rector's policy therefore focuses on pricing behavior that can have long-
term anti-competitive effects. This increases the scope for vigorous
price competition.
The Act's refusal to supply provisions appear to be another area in
which the Director is developing an enforcement policy that responds to
the objectives of industrial policy. Section 75 permits the Tribunal to
order a supplier of a product in a market to accept a person as a cus-
tomer where, among other things, a person is substantially affected in
his business or is precluded from carrying on business due to his inabil-
ity to obtain adequate supplies of a product anywhere in a market on
usual trade terms. This section applies even if the refusal to supply does
not lessen or prevent competition substantially.49 This feature has
drawn criticism, and a representative of the Bureau recently indicated
that, as a matter of policy, the Director does not intend to apply to the
Tribunal under section 75 unless there is a substantial anti-competitive
effect arising from the refusal to supply.50
The Director's enforcement policies respecting price discrimination
and predatory pricing are contained in published enforcement guide-
lines. Publication of guidelines in these areas and in relation to merg-
ers 51 supports Canada's industrial policy by promoting certainty with
48 CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS CANADA, PREDATORY PRICING ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES (1992).
"' In Director of Investigation and Research v. Chrysler Canada Ltd. 27 C.P.R. (Can. 3d) 1,
at 10 (1989), the Tribunal contrasted the refusal to deal provision with the merger provisions,
saying that while the ultimate test for mergers is whether the merger will substantially lessen
competition, for the refusal to deal provisions "the ultimate test concerns the effect on the business
of the person refused supplies".
50 These comments were made by Mr. Robert McCrone, Chief, Division "B" of the Civil
Matters Branch of the Bureau at an Insight Conference held at Toronto, Canada on May 11,
1993.
51 MEGs, supra note 32. For a detailed discussion of the MEGS, see COMPETITION LAW OF
CANADA, ch. 10 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.) (1993). See also Calvin S. Goldman, Q.C. & J.D.
Bodrug, Guidelines Under the Canadian Competition Act: A Survey of the Principal Provisions
of the New Merger Enforcement Guidelines, CLAYTON'S COMMENTARIES (July 1991); Paul S.
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respect to the Director's likely approach in a particular case. Uncer-
tainty can have a chilling effect on vigorous competitive behavior and
prevent mergers which would ultimately prove benign or even effi-
ciency-enhancing. Certainty is also promoted by the Director's Pro-
gram of Compliance, 52 pursuant to which the Director provides advi-
sory opinions and other informal feedback respecting the Act's
application to a proposed transaction or course of conduct.53 The Act
also allows the Director to issue advance ruling certificates in merger
cases where he is satisfied that he does not have sufficient grounds to
challenge the merger. 4
(iii) The Director's Submissions to Other Branches of Government
Finally, the role of a strong competition policy within Canada is
promoted through the Director's submissions to federal and provincial
bodies55 and through the ongoing involvement of the Director and
others in the Bureau in inter-departmental working groups within the
Government. For example, the Bureau provided input to the Canada/
U.S. Free Trade negotiations and to federal and provincial govern-
ments concerning the recent liberalization of legislation. governing fi-
nancial markets.56 The Director and Bureau staff play a continuing role
in developing competition policy positions for consideration by other
federal and provincial departments. 57
In summary, in several important respects, Canada's competition
policy reflects its industrial policy objectives. The merger, specialization
agreement and joint venture provisions of the Act are all designed to
allow Canadian businesses to respond to the need to operate more effi-
ciently and innovatively. However, consideration should be given to re-
forming certain provisions of the Act, including those which rely on the
Crampton, Canada's New Merger Enforcement Guidelines: A 'Nuts and Bolts' Review, at 883,
XXXVI Antitrust Bulletin (1991).
2 CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS CANADA, PROGRAM OF COMPLIANCE, Information
Bulletin No. 3 (revised) (1993).
83 Advisory opinions are obtained on an informal basis, since the Act does not expressly con-
template them. They are provided on a confidential basis. The informal and confidential process in
Canada contrasts with the formal procedure for obtaining and the publication of business review
letters in the United States.
" Subsection 102(2) of the Act, supra note 1, requires the Director to consider any request
for an advance ruling certificate "as expeditiously as possible".
55 The Act specifically empowers the Director to make representations in respect of competi-
tion matters to federal and provincial commissions, boards and other tribunals. In the Director's
1991 Annual Report, the Director refers to submissions of this nature being made in the transpor-
tation, telecommunication, agriculture and energy sectors of the economy. See Annual Report For
The Year Ended March 31, 1991, DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH, at 20-21 (1991).
See CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS CANADA, supra note 28, at 11.
87 The former Director has suggested that in the 1990s, the Bureau intends to get more
involved with the issue of competition in the regulated sector of the Canadian economy. See Wet-
ston, supra note 20, at 7.
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Director's enforcement policy to make them responsive to the objectives
of Canada's industrial policy. Proposals for reforming those provisions
and related reforms are discussed in the next section of this paper.
PART FOUR: PROPOSALs FOR REFORM
This section discusses proposals for reforming Canada's competi-
tion policy and related areas to make them more consistent with Ca-
nada's industrial policy objectives. While the focus will be on proposals
for reforming the Act, the desirability of replacing antidumping laws
with competition policy and the need to eliminate interprovincial barri-
ers to trade will also be briefly reviewed. The discussion is divided
accordingly.
(i) The Act
Price Discrimination, Predatory Pricing and Refusal to Deal
As suggested above, the legislative provisions respecting price dis-
crimination and predatory pricing should be reformed to codify the Di-
rector's approach to their enforcement. The Director's Guidelines are
not binding on Canadian courts, 58 which means that there is a limit to
how much comfort one can draw from them, especially with respect to
civil actions by private parties based on the provisions.59 Similarly, the
refusal to deal provisions should be amended to embody a test which
requires that competition in Canada be substantially lessened or pre-
vented before the Tribunal can order a supplier to accept a customer.
Misleading Advertising
Amending the misleading advertising provisions would also be de-
sirable to allow remedies which better respond to the nature of the of-
fense. ° Misleading advertising is currently a criminal offense under the
Act. However, a report by a Working Group of Consumer and Corpo-
rate Affairs Canada suggests that most cases of misleading advertising
58 The Guidelines contain statements to this effect, as well as the fact that they are not
binding on the Director or the Attorney-General of Canada.
11 The Act provides, in § 36, for the ability of private parties to sue for damages caused by a
breach of the criminal provisions of the Act, supra note 1.
'0 A disproportionate penalty can have a chilling effect on vigorous competition. For exam-
ple, in the preface to the PRICE DISCRIMINATION GUIDELINES, supra note 47, the Director has
stated that "[p]lacing a criminal ban on certain pricing behaviour ... carries with it the risk that
business persons may, because of uncertainty about the application of the law, refrain to some
extent from engaging in forms of pricing behaviour which would be healthy and beneficial for the
markets involved" (at Preface).
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should be resolved through a non-criminal adjudicative process where
the remedies would include restitution and the publication of informa-
tion notices. 1
Price Maintenance
Consideration should also be given to decriminalizing price main-
tenance. The criminal provisions respecting price maintenance contrast
noticeably to the treatment afforded other non-price vertical restraints
such as tied selling and exclusive dealing.62 For these offenses, the Tri-
bunal may issue a remedial order following a determination that com-
petition has been or is likely to be lessened substantially. As mentioned
earlier in the context of mergers and monopolies, a non-criminal ap-
proach recognizes that firms are more likely to pursue efficient prac-
tices if they do not face the prospect of imprisonment or fines. Avoiding
deterrence of pro-competitive conduct may be especially important in
the case of price maintenance, since there is debate about whether
price maintenance is in fact harmful.63
Specialization Agreements and Joint Ventures
The provisions respecting specialization agreements and joint ven-
tures may also need reform. In 1986, it was hoped that these provisions
would play a significant role in facilitating restructuring in Canada, but
they have never been used.64 Messrs. Anderson and Khosla suggest five
possible explanations for their lack of use: (i) in many cases it may be
that the parties have not had recourse to the joint venture and special-
isation agreement provisions because "the general standards applicable
under the merger and conspiracy provisions of the Act are considered
to provide sufficient scope for co-operative arrangements", 65 (ii) a lack
of awareness of the provisions within the business community; (iii) the
specific wording of the provisions, which may be perceived as limiting
their application; (iv) procedural difficulties, particularly in respect of
the specialization agreement provisions which involve proceedings
61 EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT (Report of the Working Group on Amend-
ments to the Misleading Advertising and Deceptive Marketing Practices Provisions of the Compe-
tition Act to the Director of Investigation and Research) (Jan. 31, 1991).
62 The Bureau itself has noted that the economic effects of these practices are often similar.
See CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS CANADA, supra note 28, at 41.
11 In a 1992 speech, the former Director stated that "it may be time for the Bureau to assess
how it enforces the statute against price maintenance given the vigor of the economic debate
which surrounds this issue". See Wetston, supra note 43, at 28. See also CONSUMER AND CORPO-
RATE AFFAIRS CANADA, supra note 28, at 41.
" Messrs. Anderson and Khosla state no specialization agreement has been registered nor
has there been a joint venture defended on the basis of the joint venture provisions. Anderson &
Khosla, supra note 2, at 72.
65 Id. at 72-3.
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before the Tribunal; and (v) concerns that even if a particular arrange-
ment is sanctioned, it might raise issues under the competition laws of
the other jurisdictions in which the parties operate (for example, the
United States). 6 Further study of this issue is required.
The Tribunal
Issues concerning the Tribunal's role and procedures that date
back to the Tribunal's first rulings in consent cases6 7 have resurfaced
following the Tribunal's decisions in its first two contested merger
cases, Hillsdowne8 and Southam.6 9 The statute which creates the Tri-
bunal, the Competition Tribunal Act,70 provides that proceedings
before the Tribunal "shall be dealt with as informally and expeditiously
as the circumstances and considerations of fairness permit". Yet, in a
June 1992 speech, a former Director observed that both Hillsdown and
Southam were "plagued with procedural disputes. In Southam alone,
there were a total of ten decisions on interlocutory matters". 71 The Di-
rector further stated that the extensive analytical evidence which the
Tribunal either required or said was lacking in Southam suggests the
Bureau may need to reconsider both the scope and type of information
it gathers during the review process and the manner in which informa-
tion is gathered.7 2 For example, the Director noted that it may now be
necessary for the Bureau to undertake major pricing research as part of
its review of mergers. Such research would increase the time and cost
necessary to resolve difficult merger cases and "would be difficult to
balance . . . with the need for expeditious merger review". 3 In sum-
mary, it is becoming increasingly recognized that the Tribunal's pro-
cess needs to be streamlined. 4
66 Id. at 73.
67 See Calvin S. Goldman, The Merger Resolution Process Under the Competition Act: A
Critical Time in Its Development, 22-1, OTTAWA L. REV. (1990).
68 Director of Investigation and Research v. Hillsdown Holdings (Canada) Ltd., 41 C.P.R.
(Can. 3d) 289 (1992).
69 Director of Investigation and Research v. Southam Inc. et al., 43 C.P.R. (Can. 3d) 161
(1992). For a further discussion of the Hillsdown and Southam decisions, see Calvin S. Goldman,
Q.C. and J.D. Bodrug, The Hillsdown and Southam Decisions: The First Round of Contested
Mergers Under the Competition Act, 38 MCGILL L. [ ] (1993).
70 R.S.C., ch. 19 (2d Supp.) (1985) (Can.).
71 Wetston, supra note 43, at 2.
72 Id. at 4.
73 Id.
74 At a June 7, 1993 conference conducted by The Canadian Institute in Toronto, the new
Chairman of the Competition Tribunal referred to proposed revisions to the Competition Tribunal
Rules for the purpose, among other things, of streamlining the process for conducting hearings
before the Tribunal. See The Honorable Justice W.P. McKeown, Remarks to the Fourth Annual
Conference of the Canadian Institute (June 7, 1993). The new Chairman noted that the proceed-
ings in Hillsdown took thirteen months and those in Southam took twenty-four months, while in
contrast the four consent orders that have been issued each involved proceedings which took less
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In addition to issues of process, the Tribunal's decisions in both
Southam and Hillsdown may have created uncertainty by failing either
to endorse or reject the Director's Merger Enforcement Guidelines.
Further, many competition law counsel in Canada believe the Tribu-
nal's decision in Hillsdown reflects a view of efficiencies which is incon-
sistent with giving a meaningful role to the efficiency exception for
mergers and specialization agreements in the Act. 5 The Director has
indicated that he views the portion of the Tribunal's decision dealing
with efficiencies as obiter dictum and that he will continue to apply
efficiencies in the (total welfare) manner contemplated by his Merger
Enforcement Guidelines.7 6 The uncertainty created by the different ap-
proaches of the Tribunal and the Director needs to be resolved.
The Conspiracy Exemption for Export Consortia
Like many other jurisdictions, Canada exempts from its criminal
law conspiracies which relate only to the export of products.7 7 In a
world where markets are rapidly becoming global, such an exemption
has been described by a Bureau representative as arguably "inconsis-
tent with, and a potentially destabilizing policy in, a free trade'area
and an increasingly interdependent world economy".78 As the Ameri-
can Bar Association Special Committee on International Antitrust rec-
ognized in 1991, such laws, viewed from a global perspective, are "at
best a zero-sum game".79 From the perspective of increasing Canada's
international competitiveness, Canadian industries which collude to re-
duce competition between themselves in the export market will impede
the development of their individual ability to compete internationally.
than one year (the longest taking seven months). The new Chairman noted that proceedings for
consent orders permit faster resolution of merger cases, commenting that the time taken in the
consent proceedings "were a small fraction of what would have resulted from contested proceed-
ings", id. at 9.
" See Crampton, supra note 32.
" Wetston, supra note 43, at 8.
See § 45(5) of the Act, supra note 1. Unlike in the United States, export cartels do not
need to register or otherwise disclose their existence with the government in order to rely on the
defense provided for export consortia. See, with respect to the U.S. rules respecting export consor-
tia, Paul Victor, Export Cartels: An Idea Whose Time has Passed, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 571
(1991).
11 See Derek Ireland, Notes for an Address on International Coordination of Competition
Policy to the 1991 Summer Conference on Industrial Organization, Strategic Management and
International Competitiveness, B.C. at 8 (June 21, 1991).
" Victor, supra note 77, at 577. Messrs. Anderson and Khosla refer to such cartels as an
attempt by one country to shift the terms of trade against other countries and, in effect, a "beggar
thy neighbour" strategy and that the continued existence of provisions sanctioning these cartels
"needs to be revisited from the standpoint of fostering efficient international integration". Supra
note 2, at 73.
17
Goldman and Kissack: The Role of Competition Policy in Canada's Industrial Policy
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1993
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
International Harmonization of Merger Review
Many mergers currently have dimensions that transcend a single
country.s0 Complex issues of international dimension have emerged, in-
cluding how competition policy will affect multinational corporations
and mergers involving such corporations. Examples such as the
DeHavilland and Institut Merieux8s decisions (by the European Com-
munity's Merger Task Force and U.S. Federal Trade Commission, re-
spectively) demonstrate an increasing need for inter-governmental com-
munication and harmonization of substantive principles and processes.
This is especially desirable between Canada and the United States, 2
since most international mergers involving Canadian firms also involve
U.S. firms.8
While the different characteristics of the two economies and politi-
cal factors may make it difficult to adopt identical laws in both coun-
tries, harmonization would not require it. One step toward harmoniza-
tion would be using a single notification form and time frame for pre-
merger filings. Providing one country with primary jurisdiction in re-
viewing a merger which affects both Canadian and U.S. markets may
also be desirable, but any such proposal should respect the need for
authorities in both countries to exercise their statutory mandates.84 Ab-
80 The Director recently noted that of the 500 mergers that came to the attention of the
Bureau during the first eight months of 1991, seventy-three percent involved foreign acquisitions.
See H.I. Wetston, Q.C., Developments and Emerging Challenges in Canadian Competition Law,
CORP. L. INST., FORDHAM. U. SCH. OF L., at 21 (October 1991).
81 For a discussion of the DeHavilland and Institut Merieux cases in the context of interna-
tional harmonization of merger laws, see Calvin S. Goldman, Q.C. and J.D. Bodrug, Update on
Merger Enforcement Under the Canadian Competition Act and Its Application to Multi-Na-
tional Transactions, Clayton's Commentaries, June 1992, at 3 et seq.
82 For a review of the differences and similarities between Canadian and U.S. antitrust laws,
see C.S. Goldman, Bilateral Aspects of Canadian Competition Policy, ANTTRUST L.J. 401
(1988).
83 For a discussion of the Director's and the Tribunal's jurisdiction over international trans-
actions involving Canadian firms, see Calvin S. Goldman, et al., International Mergers and the
Canadian Competition Act, CORP. L. INST., FORDHAM U. SCH. OF L., (1992), where the authors
note that nothing in the Act prevents the taking of such jurisdiction, there are valid policy reasons
and a basis in law for taking such jurisdiction and that the Bureau has indicated that it will claim
jurisdiction over such cases.
84 In this context, it may be instructive to note the cooperation between government agencies
on matters affecting jurisdiction in other contexts. The Securities and Exchange Commission in
the United States and the provincial securities commissions in Canada have entered into arrange-
ments that permit certain public disclosure documents which satisfy the requirements of one juris-
diction to be accepted in the other jurisdiction with minimal additional formality. This permits,
for example, Canadian corporations meeting certain criteria to effect public offerings in the
United States of certain securities using a Canadian prospectus cleared with the Canadian securi-
ties authorities without preparing and clearing through the Securities and Exchange Commission
a standard U.S. registration statement. This arrangement, referred to as the multijurisdictional
disclosure system, is implemented in Canada at the provincial level through policy statements
issued by the provincial securities commissions or similar authorities.
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sent agreements on primary jurisdiction, increased exchange of infor-
mation between enforcement authorities may assist in achieving consis-
tent and expeditious merger review in the two countries. This might be
achieved through a treaty similar to that on mutual legal assistance in
criminal matters between Canada and the U.S.85 which went into effect
in 1990. In that regard, a former Director has noted that a major hur-
dle to increased international cooperation in antitrust enforcement "is
the restriction on information sharing between competition authorities
imposed by various national competition laws".86 The Act prohibits the
Director from disclosing certain information other than to a Canadian
law enforcement agency or for the purposes of the administration and
enforcement of the Act.8 7 Depending on the circumstances, therefore,
disclosure to U.S. antitrust authorities could be prohibited.
Conspiracy
Section 45 of the Act prohibits agreements and other arrange-
ments which prevent or lessen competition unduly. In PANS, Gonthier,
J. said that the public policy interests underlying the conspiracy
provisions:88
are perhaps best summarized from this passage from the majority
judgment in Howard Smith . . .:
the statute proceeds upon the footing that the preventing or
lessening of competition is itself an injury to the public. It is
not concerned with public injury or public benefit from any
other standpoint.
Considerations such as private gains by the parties to the agreement
or counterbalancing efficiency gains by the public lie therefore outside
of the inquiry under [s. 45].
This statement brings into focus an unfortunate and unjustifiable
inconsistency in the Act. The specialization agreement provisions, the
merger provisions and, arguably, the joint venture provisions all reflect
a total welfare approach to competition. It is not obvious why the same
approach (which is consistent with industrial policy objectives) that
Parliament decided to take in 1986 to these matters should not be ex-
85 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, March 18, 1985, U.S.-Can.
86 See Wetston, supra note 80, at 22.
87 The inability of one antitrust authority to disclose information to the other may also arise
in the context of antitrust litigation in the United States, where a common feature is the imposi-
tion of a protective order which prevents disclosure of documents provided in the United States
pursuant to discovery requests and depositions. For a discussion of the importance of ensuring that
such protective orders allow disclosure to foreign antitrust authorities such as the Bureau, see
Goldman, supra note 83, at 51-53.
8S PANS, supra note 45, at 6.
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tended to other agreements in restraint of trade. For that reason, re-
forming the conspiracy provisions to eliminate this inconsistency should
be considered.
However, eliminating inconsistencies in the Act is not the only rea-
son to consider reforming the conspiracy provisions. Differences be-
tween Canadian competition policy and its counterpart in the United
States may place Canadian businesses at a competitive disadvantage.
The rule of reason approach to certain conspiracies in the United
States allows consideration of the efficiencies and other benefits arising
from an agreement that constrains competition. Since the PANS case
confirmed that efficiencies and other benefits are not considered in ap-
plying the Canadian conspiracy provisions, U.S. businesses may be able
to pursue agreements and enjoy efficiencies which are not available to
their Canadian counterparts.
Finally, it may be worthwhile reforming the conspiracy provisions
to more clearly deal with information exchanges among competitors for
the purpose of permitting them to "benchmark" themselves against
competitive leaders. The application of Canada's conspiracy law to
these types of arrangements is not clear, but there are policy reasons
that suggest they should be permitted in certain circumstances.
Messrs. Jorde and Teece have written extensively on the applica-
tion of antitrust law to information exchanges between competitors.
They define benchmarking as follows:"'
Benchmarking is the process by which firms discover the degree to
which they are not world-class in their various functional activities
and institute programs to emulate best practice. Typically,
benchmarking involves collecting information from excellent compa-
nies inside the industry as well as outside the industry, either directly
or through third parties.
Benchmarking is one of the ways in which businesses strive to make
themselves more internationally competitive. To that extent,
benchmarking appears to be consistent with the objectives of Canada's
industrial policy.90 However, there have been no reported cases which
89 Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrange-
ments: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 579, 596 (1993).
19 It should be noted that it appears that the Bureau has not yet accepted this proposition. In
a 1990 speech, a former Director commented:
Another justification that is often advanced for agreements among firms is the need to
compete effectively in global markets. This rationale must not be accepted blindly. Many
writers have argued to the contrary - that vigorous competition in a domestic market is
important to position firms to meet the tests of international competition.
Weston, supra note 19, at 5. As authority for the proposition that vigorous competition in a do-
mestic market is important to position firms for international competition, the former Director
cites Michael Porter's THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS. However, in a recent paper,
David Teece argues that:
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confirm its status under the conspiracy provisions of the Act.
It is possible to argue that an arrangement pursuant to which com-
petitors exchange information other than with respect to price (for ex-
ample, information on historical costs) which reduces in some respect
but, viewed overall, enhances competition between them should be
outside the scope of section 45.91 Arguably, this result is consistent
both with Canada's industrial policy objectives and the purpose clause
of the Act, in that such agreements may "expand opportunities for Ca-
nadian participation in world markets" and "promote the efficiency and
adaptability of the Canadian economy". Since the Supreme Court
noted in PANS that interpretation of the conspiracy provision "is con-
ditioned, first of all, by the purposes of the Act",92 it is arguable that
benchmarking which meets this criteria should be viewed favorably
under Canada's conspiracy law even as it exists today.93
However, in the absence of definitive guidance, the application of
the law to these types of arrangements is not clear. Messrs. Anderson
and Khosla note in their Draft Paper that "considerable caution is war-
ranted in reflecting on the policy implications of these conceptual devel-
opments".94 Given the key role that competition policy plays in imple-
menting industrial policy objectives, it is to be hoped that the Director
and the Bureau will continue to analyze the issues raised by
[a] closer reading of Porter indicates, however, that there is absolutely nothing in [The
Competitive Advantage of Nations] to suggest that U.S. antitrust law is too lax, or that
cooperation is not in fact desirable. Indeed, Porter's own examples, illustrations, documenta-
tion and analysis consistently point to the importance of cooperation. Hence his own and
other commentator's use of his study to emphasize competition over cooperation is
unwarranted.
See David J. Teece, Information Sharing, Cooperation and Antitrust, 18 (Draft paper presented
at the annual spring meeting of the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.).
91 This is not the same as considering efficiencies. The argument is not that the arrangement
creates efficiencies, it is that competition is enhanced by the arrangement.
92 PANS, supra note 45, at 29.
93 Section 45 itself provides certain areas in which the exchange of information is permitted.
Subsection 45(3) provides a defence where the agreement or arrangement relates only to the ex-
change of statistics, defining product standards, the exchange of credit information, the definition
of terminology, cooperation in research and development, restriction of advertising or promotion
(other than a discriminatory restriction), the sizes and shapes of containers, the adoption of the
metric system or measures to protect the environment. Gonthier, J. suggested in PANS (at 36)
that these are areas that may not be injurious to competition. However, the Act restricts the
availability of the defence. Subsection 45(4) provides the defence is unavailable if the arrange-
ment lessens or is likely to lessen competition unduly in respect of prices, quantity or quality of
production, markets or customers and channels or methods of distribution or restricts or is likely
to restrict a person from entering into or expanding in the business. These restrictions have, in the
words of representatives of the Canadian Department of Justice, had the effect of making the
defence in subsection 45(3) "somewhat hollow". See Dambrot & Tyhurst, Conspiracy and Bid-
Rigging: A Conceptual Framework, 29 (Dec. 1989) (Paper prepared for an Insight Conference,
Toronto, Canada).
Anderson & Khosla, supra note 2, at 69.
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benchmarking and consider whether the conspiracy provisions should
be reformed to more clearly indicate when such activities are
permissible.95
In the absence of legislative reform, this is an area where the ef-
fectiveness of competition policy can be enhanced by increasing the
level of communication between business and the Bureau so that there
is as much consultation as realistically possible both in specific cases
and in areas requiring new enforcement approaches. The enforcement
policies of the Director will be especially important in this regard,96
since the Supreme Court of Canada is unlikely to reconsider the con-
spiracy sections in the near future. From the perspective of Canadian
businesses competing internationally and the objectives of Canada's in-
dustrial policy, it should be noted that it has been argued that the "rule
of reason" approach should apply to benchmarking by U.S. corpora-
tions and that "in almost all circumstances there will be no anti-com-
petitive harm".97
(ii) Antidumping and Competition Policy
The basic theme of this section is that antidumping law98 in both
Canada and the United States should be replaced with a harmonized
competition law dealing with predatory pricing.
95 In fact, there are indications that the Bureau is now considering its position. Messrs. An-
derson and Khosla refer in their Draft Paper to a forthcoming working paper entitled Inter-Firm
Cooperation and the Law on Conspiracy. See Anderson & Khosla, supra note 2, at 65.
9" Some guidance is already being given. In a recent paper, Harry Chandler, Deputy Direc-
tor of Investigation and Research (Criminal Matters), discussed information exchanges between
members of the oil and gas industry. See Harry Chandler, Competition Law Issues in the Up-
stream Oil and Gas Industry, 31-1 ALBERTA L. RaV. 72 (1993). Mr. Chandler provided some
"suggestions to avoid coming into conflict with the conspiracy sections". These included:
(i) information exchanges should be of a generalized nature and non-company specific;
(ii) individual firms should be free to determine which policies to follow on their own;
(iii) information should be based on past historical data. There should be no indication of
future prices or trading terms;
(iv) associations should exercise extreme caution in the formulation and implementation of
guidelines in relation to important competitive aspects of their business;
(v) where there is collection of data from industry participants (market share, pricing, etc),
they should be collected by an independent firm, and the collection of this data should
ensure that the anonymity of members is preserved;
(vi) the results from the data collected should be publicly available. The prospect of a wider
audience, be they non-members or the general public, will reduce the likelihood of anti-
competitive effects;
(vii) associations should avoid any policing to coerce members to follow association guidelines;
and
(viii) no sanctions should be imposed on members who choose not to follow association
guidelines.
°' See Jorde & Teece, supra note 84, at 598.
'8 Antidumping duties can be distinguished from countervailing duties, which are meant to
overcome subsidies provided by a foreign government.
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Canada introduced antidumping laws in 1904.19 Currently, both
Canada and the United States frequently impose antidumping duties.
In a recent study by the C.D. Howe Institute, 100 the authors note that
during the period 1980-90, Canada and the United States initiated
49.5 % of global antidumping actions and that antidumping duties are
used more frequently by Canadian firms against U.S. firms than vice
versa.
101
Many reasons have been cited for replacing antidumping laws with
competition law. Among these are that there is no economic justifica-
tion for them,1"2 that they are inconsistent with the objectives of freer
trade between Canada and the United States1 3 and that they have
been used for political expediency rather than with a consistent policy
objective.L04 One of Canada's objectives in negotiating the Free Trade
Agreement was to reduce their use and, in fact, the Free Trade Agree-
ment achieved some success in this area.10 5
A case can be made for replacing antidumping laws with a harmo-
nized law respecting predatory pricing in both Canada and the United
States. The example of the European Community demonstrates that
such an arrangement is workable. It must be acknowledged, however,
that the Treaty of Rome creates a substantially closer relationship
among the members of the European Community than the relationship
between Canada and the United States under the Free Trade Agree-
ment or that among Canada, the United States and Mexico under the
" The United States did so in 1916. For a further discussion of the background to and the
evolution of Canadian antidumping laws, see Calvin S. Goldman, Competition, Anti-Dumping
Law and the Canada-U.S. Trade Negotiations, 4 (Notes for an Address to the Canada/United
States L. Inst. of Case W. Res. U. Sch. of L., Cleveland, Ohio) (April 3, 1987).
100 T.M. Boddez and Michael J. Trebilcock, C.D. HOWE INST. POLICY STUDY, Unfinished
Business: Reforming the Trade Remedy Laws in North America, 17 (1993).
101 During the period, Canada initiated fifty-two actions against the United States, while the
U.S. initiated twenty-four. Id. at 15. Most recently, the United States increased its antidumping
duties on hot and cold-rolled steel from, among other places, Canada. See M. Hallman and K.
McParland, Steel Companies Hammered Again, THE FIN. POST, June 23, 1993 at 1. Less than
one week later, Canada imposed antidumping duties on cold-rolled sheet steel from, among other
places, the United States. See Reuter, Canada Slaps Duty on Steel Imports, THE FIN.
Y POST, June 30, 1993 at 3.
102 Boddez & Trebilcock, supra note 100, at 163-85, where the authors discuss both the
economic and "ethical" arguments in favour of antidumping duties, concluding in each case that
these arguments do not support the use of antidumping duties.
10I See Goldman, supra note 99, at 6.
104 It has been noted that antidumping "not only reduces international competitiveness and
consumer welfare but as well has a negative influence on the enforcement of other parts of the
Canadian Competition Act and other aspects of international competition policy coordination".
See Ireland, supra note 78, at 11.
1o See Boddez & Trebilcock, supra note 100, at viii where the authors suggest that the
creation of the bi-national panel under the Free Trade Agreement has "imposed a substantially
more rigorous standard of review on domestic administrative agencies charged with applying these
laws than the domestic judicial review processes that previously applied". See also at 152.
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NAFTA. Another and perhaps better model for Canada and the
United States is the arrangement between Australia and New Zealand,
which eliminated antidumping between the two countries in favor of a
harmonized predatory pricing law which permits courts to take juris-
diction over predating parties in either country. Admittedly, one danger
in relying too heavily on the Australia and New Zealand example is
that they have not had the high level of antidumping actions that has
existed between Canada and the United States. 06 However, there ap-
pears to be a growing body of opinion that harmonization is not only
desirable, but feasible. 107
The implementation of the NAFTA should not change the desira-
bility or feasibility of eliminating antidumping laws as between Canada
and the United States. Under Article 1501 of the NAFTA, each coun-
try commits itself to adopting and maintaining effective competition
laws. While the recent C.D. Howe Study suggests that given the short
history of Mexican competition laws, 08 Canada and the United States
will be unlikely to rely on Mexican competition law as a substitute for
antidumping duties vis-a-vis Mexico, the study also notes that there is
no reason that Canada and the United States cannot make progress
between themselves by replacing antidumping with competition laws. 0 9
Allowing Canadian and American business to operate on a larger-scale
would assist in placing them on an equal footing with their competitors
in the European Community." 0 This would be consistent with Ca-
nada's industrial policy objectives.
(iii) Interprovincial Barriers to Trade
In the Meech Lake Accord, the federal and provincial govern-
108 See A. Kaell, International Linkages: Competition and Industrial -Policies, 22 (Nov.
1992) (draft discussion paper prepared for the OECD Committee on Competition Law and
Policy).
107 The chairman of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, which rules on some aspects
of dumping complaints from Canadian businesses, recently said that "Canadian businesses would
benefit from attempts to negotiate a new trade dispute system between Canada and the U.S. that
would not permit either country to launch anti dumping cases against each other. Instead, compa-
nies in both countries would use competition laws, such as laws banning predatory pricing, to seek
recourse." See J. McFarland, Disputes Worse Under FTA, THE FIN. POST, March 25, 1993 at 6.
See also Boddez & Trebilcock, supra note 100, at 230.
108 See Boddez Trebilcock, supra note 102, at 271, where the authors state that the Mexican
government has recently introduced inio Congress "an extensive Federal Act Governing Economic
Competition".
109 Id. at 273. This may be possible by building on the success of bi-lateral arrangements
such as the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (cited in note 85). Another example of bi-lateral
cooperation is the development of the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System between Canada and
the United States, supra note 85.
10 See Ireland, supra note 78, at 12, where the author states that until "antidumping and
other [non-tariff barriers] between [Canada and the United States] disappear, North American
producers will not be competing on equal terms with European Community companies".
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ments proposed to strengthen the common market clause in the Cana-
dian constitution. This would have led to a reduction in or the elimina-
tion of interprovincial trade barriers and a substantial savings to the
Canadian economy. The Government has estimated that interprovincial
barriers to trade add $6.5 billion in costs to the Canadian economy
each year."" In addition to these massive costs, barriers to inter-
provincial trade also prevent interprovincial competition between firms.
The Porter Study highlighted the importance of vigorous domestic
competition as a critical element of strengthening Canadian businesses
to compete internationally.
Unfortunately, the Meech Lake Accord died and with it the pro-
posal to strengthen Canada's common market clause. Following the
collapse of the Meech Lake Accord, the general view of government
officials seems to have been that it was time to put aside for a while
attempting to reform the constitution." 2 While a constitutional solution
does not seem likely, it was recently announced that the federal Fi-
nance Minister would meet with his provincial counterparts to deter-
mine strategies to eliminate interprovincial barriers to trade. It is to be
hoped that direct negotiation between governments, unburdened from
the other political issues associated with the Meech Lake Accord, will
achieve greater results.
CONCLUSION
This paper has outlined the objectives of Canadian industrial pol-
icy and the manner in which Canadian competition policy implements
those objectives. Despite the initiatives taken by the Government since
1984, and the generally effective manner in which the Act reflects in-
dustrial policy objectives, certain reforms remain highly desirable.
Some of these reforms will require changes in the law. Others will re-
quire only that the Director demonstrate a willingness, as he has done
in the past, to enforce the Act in a manner consistent with- industrial
policy objectives. The Government has sponsored a number of studies
in recent years which have highlighted the critical importance to the
Canadian economy of developing international competitiveness. Simply
put, rising competitiveness means a rising standard of living. The con-
.. CANADA, INVENTING OUR FUTURE: AN ACTION PLAN FOR CANADA'S PROSPERITY, 15
(1992). It has also been reported that there are 500 existing barriers to interprovincial trade and
that some officials in certain provinces had at one time pushed for an "economic union agreement
that would have allowed them to maintain all 500 existing trade barriers, while pledging to put up
no more". See D. Fagan, Feelings Mixed on Plan to End Trade Barriers, THE GLOBE & MAIL,
July 10, 1992.
"I Following the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord, one leading Canadian business journal-
ist said that "what's best about this outcome is that no politician will dare utter the 'C' word for
years". See Diane Francis, Tackle Real Issues and We'll Win the Ballgame, THE FIN. POST,
October 27, 1993 at 17.
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verse is also true. For that reason, in the 1990s competition policy
should remain a key element of Canada's industrial policy.
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